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Christopher Co/dough
Of Price and Policy Distortions
This article argues that the importance of price policy
has been underplayed in many structuralist analyses of
development problems. This, however, is not because
such writers have held that incentives are unimportant
- rather that they have assumed that the extent of
deviation of domestic from 'world' prices is less than
has typically been the case. Equally, the article argues
that the 'discovery' of the extent of price distortions in
many African economies has resulted in price policy
and the opening up of domestic markets to
competitive forces being reasserted as the core
elements in any recovery programme for African
economies. The danger of this lies not in the increased
attention given to price policy per se, but rather with
the set of intellectual baggage which a central concern
with price often carries with it. Much theoretical and
empirical work in the structuralist tradition has shown
the ways in which the 'special case' of neoclassical
theory is insufficient as a framework for understanding
development problems. The heat of the debate (e.g.
IDS 1983 versus World Bank 1981) stems partly from
fears that this framework is being reasserted as the
dominant paradigm - at least as regards the policy
debate - and that part of what has been learnt over
the past decade risks being rejected for inadequate
reasons.
In order to provide some basis for the above
judgements, it is worthwhile examining the treatment
of price policy in some prominent examples of
structuralist writings. Those selected here - on the
grounds of their representativeness and importance
- are the ILO Report on Kenya tILO 1972] and the
joint IDS/Worid Bank volume, Redistribution with
Growth, published in 1974. The main issues of
importance in pricing policy concern the need to
stimulate the output of the tradeable goods sectors as
against services, to shift the internal terms of trade
towards agriculture, and to permit a structure of
domestic agricultural prices which is not funda-
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mentally out of line with international prices for the
same commodities. The ways in which these issues
were addressed in the above volumes will now be
briefly discussed.
The ILO Kenya report acknowledged that one of the
important ways in which the government could assist
agricultural development was by raising the producer
price of agricultural commodities. Nevertheless, the
report gave little space and emphasis to the analysis of
this problem (ppl58-9). The prices of some
commodities - maize, milk, sugar, beef and cotton
- had been raised in 1972 and it was felt that there was
limited scope for further increases. The report judged
that the prices of export crops were mainly determined
by world market prices - yet evidence on the between
world relationship and domestic producer prices was
not presented, and the question of currency
depreciation was not discussed. For food products,
the judgement was similar: here the prices were fixed
by government, and they had generally been above
export parity prices except in the case of beef.
Furthermore, while some smallholders would benefit
from increased food prices, the main recipients would
have been the large farmers, with the losers being poor
rural and urban households in whose budgets food
featured large. Thus, agricultural output was expected
to be more sensitive to the provision of better
extension, research and credit facilities, and land
redistribution towards smallholders, than to changes
in pricing policies.
In retrospect it does appear that Kenya was following
a reasonably efficient set of agricultural pricing
policies at that time [Sharpley 1984]. Over the 1970s
there was close conformity between international and
producer prices for export crops, converted at the
official exchange rate. Price trends favoured exporters
(with the exception of beef), rather than producers of
food, particularly until 1978. Yet even for food,
between 1972 and 1978 domestic border prices
exceeded world border export prices by a significant
margin. Thus, without begging the question of the
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relationship between the shadow and official exchange
rates - a matter which has not been conclusively
resolved in the literature - a move to bring domestic
producer prices into line with world export prices at
the official exchange rate would have involved
reducing, rather than increasing, the prices paid to
smaliholders in comparison with those which were
actually paid. Nevertheless, even though its con-
clusions on the matter of agricultural pricing policy
were broadly correct at that time, the report gave only
limited attention to this area of policy as part of its
implied long-term strategy; by implication, pricing
policy could be left to take care of itself.
Redistribution, Growth and Prices
Since it represents a more general theoretical
statement of the structuralist position, it is worth
considering the treatment given to agricultural prices
in Redistribution with Growth. The main theoretical
hypothesis of this volume was the Ricardian one that
income increments arising from economic growth
accrue mainly to the owners of assets - capital, land
and skills .- and to those whose entry into wage
labour is facilitated by the process of asset growth.
Since, however, the increment to wage labour in ldcs is
rarely as large as the increment to the labour force, it is
reasonable to suppose that those without assets may
be largely unaffected by economic growth, and that
the numbers experiencing such poverty will continue
to grow. Thus, since asset distribution in developing
countries is typically even more unequal than ïncome
distribution, the benefits of growth will only begin to
reduce poverty significantly if the poor themselves are
given heightened access to productive resources -
beyond that delivered by the market process. This
argument, therefore, implied that the distribution of
assets should be purposively and significantly changed
over time.
The book's prognosis essentially involved strategies
which would protect economic growth, while securing
asset redistribution at the same time. These comprised
aseries of policy interventions to influence the level and
growth of income to different groups in society. They
included interventions in factor markets, in the
ownership and control of assets, in the taxation of
personal income and wealth, in the provision of public
consumption goods, in commodity markets, and in
technological innovations. These analyses, however,
did not give much attention to agricultural pricing
policy. Consider the following quotation:
Family income (of peasant households) is basically
constrained by the availability of complementary
physical inputs . . . and by the prices received for
their output. Since the scope for manipulating farm
prices . . . is limited, government policy must
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attempt to provide access to an approximate mix of
physical and financial inputs (and technical know-
how) in order to raise incomes in this sector. This is
unlikely to be achieved solely through changes in
relative prices, although they facilitate the
productive use of existing assets.
[World Bank/IDS 1974: 4]
The reasons why the authors of Redistribution with
Growth believed there to be little scope for
manipulating farm prices in general were not clearly
stated. Implicitly at least, this omission implied a view
that exchange rates are not seriously over-valued, and
that world prices, net of transport and marketing
costs, do by and large get passed on to producers. If
either of these conditions were not satisfied it would
not be correct to argue that little could be done to
affect farm prices as measured in domestic currency
- that is, unless one also took the view that for
political reasons an effective devaluation is generally
unattainable, or that nominal protection coefficients
for both food and export crops could not be raised, or
lowered, as the case may be. We shall return to these
possibilities later.
Although Redistribution with Growth remained silent
about pricing policy in the export sector, a little was
said about pricing policy problems for wage goods,
including food. The analysis of this issue, however,
also suggested little room for manoeuvre. In the case
of food products the book implied that, in general,
increases in their prices would be desirable: the terms
of trade between agriculture and other sectors had
been biased against the former as a result of public
policy (pp 124-5), and some increases in food prices
were needed in many cases, even though this would
tend to decrease the real incomes of wage-earners and
the food-deficit self-employed in both the formal and
informal sectors.
This last consideration leads to the view that one
might seek price support for agricultural products
based upon first, the extent of their production by the
poorest farmers, and second their proportional
importance in low-income family budgets. A selective
approach would thus be implied, taking into account
the secondary employment effects of increasing
product prices, for different products in different
countries. Taken together, these analyses imply that,
while prices are important, they are only one element
in the process of eliciting a desirable pattern of
production and distribution, and that the scope for
changing the prices received by farmers is in any case
rather limited.
Primacy of Prices
The World Bank, and other sources, have recently
Production incentives include availabilit' of consumer goods to rural producers.
challenged these views strongly. In its report on
Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa, the
crisis facing agricultural production in SSA is well
documented: it is shown that agricultural production
growth rates declined during the 1970s to less than
rates of population growth; agricultural exports
stagnated, and the shares of world trade captured by
Africa for many agricultural commodities declined
over the period; food production per capita also
declined over the 1970s, and food imports increased to
fill the gap - in some cases, dramatically so. The main
factors which led to this production crisis are said to be
drought, the disruptions caused by wars and civil
strife, rapid population growth which has increased
the intensity of the land constraint, neglect of
agricultural investment by governments and donors,
'bad' pricing policies, the non-availability of necessary
inputs and inefficient marketing arrangements.
In tackling this list of problems, the report deliberately
concentrates upon policy reform proposals which are
viewed to be necessary for their amelioration. It
acknowledges that investment priorities in agriculture
are equally important (p50) but chooses to concentrate
on policy questions. Four priorities are selected: a
renewed emphasis upon smallholder production,
changing existing incentives structures, expanding
agricultural research, and emphasising quick-yielding
activities in irrigated agriculture. Among these, the
incentives question is believed to be most important:
more space is devoted to this issue than to the other
three combined, and the recommendations are more
crisp and better researched in this than in the other
policy areas. The report quotes evidence from micro-
level studies which point to 'the almost over-riding
importance of producer prices in affecting production
often cutting across the quality of technical
packages and extension services' (p55). It cites also the
large amount of micro-evidence which indicates
substantial farmer responsiveness to price.
Data are presented which indicate that public policy
has discriminated against farmers in African countries.
Table 1 reproduces part of this evidence. It shows that
over the l970s for nine crops in 12 SSA countries,
farmers have typically received far less than the
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international price for their products - after allowing
for transport, marketing and processing costs. These
ratios reflect, therefore, the implicit level of taxation of
export crops. The ratios are calculated at official
exchange rates. Making allowance for the extent of
currency over-valuation would, therefore, reduce
these ratios still further. The Bank estimates that in a
good number of the countries shown, the combined
effects of taxation, inefficient marketing arrangements
(since actual costs are deducted before calculation of
the ratios) together with currency over-valuation,
have been such as to reduce the level of returns to
producers below half of their real value as measured
by international prices. It is for these and other
reasons that the Berg report puts prices at the centre of
its agenda for policy reform.
As indicated above, the report does make reference to
a very wide range of other policy problems in African
states. The prominence given to price policy, however,
represents a clear shift in emphasis as compared with
that of Redistribution with Growth, i.e., it not only
argues that prices are important, but it argues that
something can be done about them - even in the
current politico-economic circumstances facing
African states. The remainder of this article argues
that the task of achieving such policy change will be
more difficult than is often acknowledged. It also
suggests the type of evidence which is required before
further progress in these matters can easily be made.
Problems of Tax and Tax Reduction Impact
In one sense, mere inspection of the data in Table lis
sufficient to suggest a prima facie case for the need to
increase the returns to farmers in Africa. Effective tax
rates of over 50 per cent cannot easily be justified on a
group of producers, some of whom comprise a
substantial proportion of the pocrest 30 per cent of the
population. Equally, to the extent that producers are
price responsive, to deny them half the real returns
accruing from increased sales must certainly prevent
agricultural production from being as high as it
otherwise might.
There are two particular issues, however, which have
been under-stressed in earlier discussions. The first is
that public revenues from export taxes are - or at any
rate were - a major source of finance to the public
sector. Given the size of existing budget deficits,
substantial short-term adjustment of these tax rates
has usually been difficult or even impossible.
The problem has been further compounded since
1979, when - unlike the earlier period - terms of
trade facing exporters of agricultural commodities
have declined substantially. A situation of falling
agricultural prices and rising public sector deficits is
hardly one in which the prospect of reducing tax rates
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on a major revenue source is easy to achieve without
significant costs, e.g. to inflation rates. Even for crops
where the price elasticity of supply is very high, and
where the revenues arising from increased sales would
partly - or even fully - compensate the public sector
for lower tax rates, the lag in supply response for most
crops must imply that the short-term effects on public
revenues would be strongly negative. Thus, the
possibilities for reducing existing levels of taxation on
export crops will vary significantly between countries.
Inter a/ia they will depend upon the proportional
importance to the public budget of revenues from a
particular crop, on the elasticity of its supply, and on
its likely production lag in response to price changes.
Distributional questions would also be important -
including the extent to which the crops in question
generated a substantial part of smaliholder incomes -
as would the condition that increases in national or
continental supply should not significantly reduce
world market prices of the crops concerned. The
answers to these questions will vary substantially
between different crops and countries. More data and
analysis at the country level are required before one
could conclude firmly that this area of policy reform is
generally a feasible (and not just a desirable) strategy
for the short and medium terms over the sub-continent
as a whole.
A second issue of importance is the extent to which
high levels of domestic taxation do help to explain the
poor performance of agricultural production in Africa
over the 1970s as compared with earlier decades. The
data in Table I show that in one third of the cases some
reduction in effective taxation rates was achieved
between 1976 and 1984, while in the remainder of cases
rates were increased over the period. This trend may
be thought compatible, at least, with the declining
agricultural production record over the l970s.
Nevertheless, taxation of export crops is not a new
phenomenon in Africa. Governments during both the
colonial and post-colonial periods have used export
taxes as a source of domestic revenue. TheAccelerared
Development Report provides no evidence as to
whether such taxation during the 1970s, or sub-
sequently, has been greater than in the past. However,
the data in Table 2 (not directly comparable with
Table l,since, here, marketing and transport costs are
not deducted) indicate that effective taxation rates
have been high for many years, and that for more than
half of the countries and crops shown the trend has
been towards reducing rates oftaxation over the 1970s
as compared with earlier periods. However, more data
for earlier years and other countries are needed to
increase the representativeness of the sample.
Meanwhile, it remains an open question as to whether
effective rates of taxation are important in explaining
the poor agricultural performance of SSA during the
1970s as compared with the previous decade.
Table 1
Nominal Protection Coefficients' of Selected Export Crops
Note: 'Defined as the price paid to the producer divided by the amount he would have received had he sold his crops at the world
market price, minus transport, marketing and processing costs.
Source: World Bank 1981: 56.
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Crop Country 1971-75
Coefficient Observations
1976-80
Coefficient Observations
Cocoa Cameroon 0.37 2 0.45 2
Ghana 0.47 5 0.40 4
Ivory Coast 0.56 2 0.38 1
Togo 0.50 5 0.25 4
Coffee Cameroon
(Arabica) 0.72 2 0.60 2
Cameroon
(Robusta) . . . . 0.36
Ivory Coast 0.68 1 0.36
Kenya 0.94 1
Tanzania 0.80 5 0.59 4
Togo 0.42 5 0.23 4
Cotton Cameroon .. .. 0.79 1
Ivory Coast 0.79 1 1.05 1
Kenya 1.07 1 .
Malawi 0.68 5 0.75 2
Mali 0.55 2 0.44 4
Senegal 0.65 2 .
Sudan 0.78 2 0.60
Togo 0.62 5 0.79 4
Upper Volta .
. 0.79
Groundnuts Malawi 0.79 5 0.59 2
Mali 0.57 2 0.43 4
Senegal 0.48 4 0.66 4
Sudan 0.85 3 0.67 1
Zambia 0.70 5 0.71 4
Maize Kenya 0.96 1 1.33 1
Malawi 1.68 5 1.34 2
Zambia 0.72 5 0.78 4
Sesame Sudan 0.83 1 0.59 1
Upper Volta 0.88 1
Tea Kenya 0.89 1
Tobacco Malawi 0.42 5 0.28 2
Zambia 1.09 5 0.88 4
Wheat Kenya 1.43 1
Table 2
Percentage of World Market Prices Received by Farmers, by Crop and Country
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Source: Calculated from Bates 1981, Appendix B, pp136-45
Real Exchange Rates and Real Grower Prices
One problem for the above analysis, of course, is its
partial nature. Supply responsiveness cannot be
judged only with respect to effective rates of taxation.
It is dependent also on movements in the real
international price of the commodities in question,
upon movements in the real exchange rate, upon levels
of domestic inflation, and upon cross elasticities of
supply with regard to other crops. Thus, if real
exchange rates have increased over time, the resulting
decrease in returns to farmers, even during periods
when international prices of commodities remained
constant in real terms, may more than compensate for
any reduction in effective rates of taxation facing their
products. Thus, the other central aspect of pricing
policy which affects farmers' returns is the price of
foreign exchange.
It is now clear that in many African countries the price
of foreign currency is too low. This situation is the
result of domestic inflation rates consistently
exceeding the world inflation rate, in circumstances
where the exchange rate has remained unchanged, or
has depreciated insufficiently to restore earlier price
relativities. This has meant that imports are typically
cheaper than they should be and, since the price of
Africa's exports are generally fixed in terms of foreign
exchange, that the domestic revenues accruing to
exporters are too low. Reassertion ofthe 'true' price of
imports and exports would allow a move away from
tariffs and direct controls towards price as a means of
limiting import demand, an increase in the domestic
currency earnings of exporters and, vía these price
effects, an increase in both export production and
earnings of foreign exchange. It is for these reasons
Crop Counrri' Period
No. of
Observations
Percen tage of
World Price Received
Cotton Nigeria 1950-60 10 20
1960-70 10 23
1970-77 4 55
Sudan 1961-62 2 44
197 1-72 2 49
Tanzania 1966-70 4 63
1970-75 5 50
Cocoa Nigeria 1950-60 10 63
1960-70 10 52
1970-77 7 60
Ghana 1950-59 10 51
1960-64 5 66
Groundnuts Nigeria 1950-59 10 54
1960-69 10 48
1970- 76 6 57
Senegal 1962-69 8 45
1970-73 3 34
Palm Oil Nigeria 1950-59 10 71
1960-69 10 61
1970-72 2 53
Palm Kernels Nigeria 1950-59 10 62
1960-69 10 49
1970-76 6 77
that the Bank believes that 'trade and exchange rate
policy is at the heart of the failure to provide adequate
incentives for agricultural production and exports in
much of Africa' [World Bank 1981: 24], that
'devaluation is a powerful tool for restructuring
(these) relative prices and incentives' [op. cii.: 30] and
that in this context the exchange rate 'is one ofthe most
pervasive instruments of development policy' [Please
and Amoako 1983: 23].
The problems with this analysis relate not to the
judgement that exchange rates in Africa are presently
over-valued, but rather to whether or flot nominal
devaluation will succeed - in existing politico-
economic circumstances - in achieving a real
effective downward adjustment of the exchange rates,
such that the benefits mentioned above can be
captured. It is well known that for this to be achieved it
is necessary that domestic prices should not adjust
upwards so as to fully counteract the extent of the
nominal devaluation. In such circumstances the net
effect would be to leave internal and external price
relativities unchanged and to produce a higher level of
domestic inflation than that which existed prior to the
devaluation.
The available evidence suggests that such price erosion
has occurred in many of the African countries which
have initiated nominal devaluations over the past few
years: their subsequent inability to hold domestic
money incomes in check has more than negated the
effects of the devaluation [see World Bank 1983: 8-9
IMF 1982; U Tun Wai and Acquah 1982].
This experience suggests that the real need is to analyse
the process by which internal prices adjust in response
to an exchange rate movement, rather than merely to
estimate the size of the desirable exchange rate shift
itself. It remains true that movement in the nominal
exchange rate is a potent instrument for achieving
shifts in short-term price relativities. But the process
by which these shifts can be sustained in the longer
term, i.e., by which domestic groups can be forced to
accept the new real income relativities imposed by the
nominal exchange rate adjustment - becomes the
most important part of the analysis of this aspect of
domestic policy reform. It should not be surprising
if the cause of the problem is the existence of a
sustained differential between national and world
inflation rates - that its solution should remain
elusive if the only instrument used to tackle it is the
exchange rate, rather than instruments designed to
address the underlying causes of the inflation rate
differential itself.
The potential for achieving real effective devaluation
will differ between countries and time periods. In some
countries the crucial variable will be the power of
labour to protect the real value of wages and salaries.
In the two country cases of Kenya and Mauritius
examined by Godfrey (1984) the data suggest that
while final prices offset all or part of the effects of
devaluation, wage and salary rises were not a
substantial factor in these increases. While this might
have been caused by a time-lag in the adjustment
process, it suggests that, at least ad interim, the main
benefits of devaluation accrued to the employers of
labour, with the self-employed (including those in the
agricultural sector) remaining little better off, and the
main burden being shouldered by employees. The
conditions for achieving an effective devaluation thus
depend strongly upon the characteristics of domestic
labour markets and production structures, and -
perhaps equally strongly - upon the disposition of
power and influence amongst competing interest
groups. More country-based studies incorporating
economic, historical and political analysis are
required in order to explore the nature and diversity of
these relationships. Without the benefit of such
analyses, judgements to the effect that particular
countries should nominally devalue by a particular
amount cannot be expected, on average, to produce
helpful results.
Conclusion
Structuralist theorists have tended not to give much
attention to agricultural price policy - either in their
attempt to explain the causes of poverty, or in their
prescriptions for its alleviation. This has arisen in part
from the need to move beyond the static framework
within which price theory traditionally has been
based, and from the need to emphasise that the
complementary inputs required to enhance output are
typically not in elastic supply. Output and incomes,
therefore, are clearly constrained by factors which go
well beyond the issue of price. Some structuralist
writings, however, have adopted the view that there is
in any case little room for manoeuvre in changing real
agricultural price levels. This was based upon the
judgemerit that the resource costs involved were too
great to sustain domestic prices at higher than their
corresponding international levels for more than short
periods of time. The extent of downward deviation of
domestic from international prices was either viewed
to be not problematic, or to be a necessary
concomitant of raising investible resources for
industrialisation.
Recent work by the World Bank and other analysts,
however, has demonstrated that the extent of such
downward variation is typically very large in SSA. A
successful narrowing ofthese differentials would bring
significant welfare benefits in the short-run, and
probable further benefits via resource reallocation in
the medium to long-run. Several aspects of this debate
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about agricultural pricing policy, however, have been
unsatisfactory. First, it has not been properly
demonstrated that the real tax burden on the
agricultural sector has increased over the 1970s, as
compared with earlier decades, nor, therefore,
whether this is a key variable in explaining declining
agricultural performance. Second, little attention has
been given to finding feasible ways in which this tax
burden could be lightened in circumstances where
governments already face steep declines in real
revenues. Third, and most important, much emphasis
has been placed, by advocates of policy reform, upon
manipulation of the exchange rate in order to correct
relative prices. Although in the short-run the exchange
rate is a powerful instrument, exclusive emphasis upon
variations in its nominal value risks ignoring the
reasons why relative price shifts have been historically
imposed, i.e. it ignores the political, economic and
social causes of past differentials between domestic
and international rates of inflation. These causes will
need to be analysed more seriously than hitherto if
admonitions to reform domestic policy are to be
heeded - or if the reasons for the failure of reform
experiments are to be better understood.
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